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Imagine it is summer 2019, and President Trump’s plan to build a wall 
on the southern border fails to overcome a filibuster in the Senate; 
nonetheless, he remains committed to building the wall. Finding that 
Mexico refuses to foot the bill in Congress’s stead, Trump redirects a small 
portion of funds from other budgets into a Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) account designated for financing the wall. DHS then hires 
contractors and begins construction. Congressional leaders are outraged—
President Trump has usurped their power of the purse. In a rare moment of 
bipartisanship, Congress passes legislation over a presidential veto directing 
DHS to return the funds to the proper budgets and to cease payments to 
contractors. Trump ignores the directive. DHS continues building the wall. 
Does Congress have standing to sue the President? 
Although fanciful, this scenario parallels a recent suit by the House of 
Representatives against the Obama administration.1 In House v. Burwell, the 
House sued the Department of Health and Human Services for allegedly 
spending billions of unappropriated dollars, plus failing to implement the so-
called employer mandate in the Affordable Care Act.2 Congress itself did 
not file suit—Democrats in the Senate would have made that impossible—
but the House sued as an institutional plaintiff after passing an authorizing 
resolution.3 The Obama administration responded that the House did not 
have standing.4 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
split the baby, holding that the House had standing for the appropriation 
claim but not the enforcement claim.5 The court then ruled for the House on 
the merits but stayed the injunction pending appeal.6 
 
* Branden Lewiston, A.B. Princeton University 2014, J.D. Georgetown Law 2017, is an 
attorney practicing in Washington, D.C. 
 1. See United States House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 
2015). 
 2. Id. at 57. 
 3. Id. at 63. 
 4. Id. at 67, 70. 
 5. Id. at 75–76. 
 6. United States House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 189 
(D.D.C. 2016). 
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The standing claim in House v. Burwell was “novel and largely 
unprecedented.”7 However, in an era of divided government and gridlock, 
executive action becomes increasingly appealing.8 The prospect of an 
unfulfilled agenda tempts presidents to act unilaterally. The Obama 
administration even trumpeted its executive actions in response to 
congressional gridlock with the slogan “We Can’t Wait.”9 President Trump 
has promised to follow suit with wide-ranging executive actions of his 
own.10 When presidents unilaterally implement controversial aspects of their 
agenda, members of Congress in the opposition will use all the tools at their 
disposal to thwart that action.11 If the ruling in House v. Burwell stands, the 
congressional suit will be one of Congress’s tools.12 
Although the standing decision in House v. Burwell is novel, the 
Supreme Court has addressed some related standing questions. As will be 
discussed in more detail below, the Court granted standing to individual 
legislators in Coleman v. Miller13 and Powell v. McCormack,14 but it denied 
standing to members of Congress in Raines v. Byrd.15 The Court has granted 
 
 7. Jonathan Adler, House Obamacare Lawsuit Clears First Major Hurdle (In Part), 
WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/09/10/house-obamacare-suit-clears-first-major-hurdle-in-
part/?utm_term=.9b4b70cfbef0. See also Lyle Denniston, Judge: Billions Spent Illegally on 
ACA Benefits, SCOTUSBLOG.COM (May 12, 2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016 
/05/judge-billions-spent-illegally-on-aca-benefits/ (“It is highly unusual for courts to allow 
one house of Congress, or individual lawmakers, to sue in federal court.”). 
 8. See Jaime Fuller, Executive Actions: An Increasingly Common Way for Congress to 
Hate Presidents, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2014/11/17/executive-actions-an-increasingly-common-way-for-congress-to-hate-
presidents/?utm_term=.317a9d3dddd2; Charlie Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets 
Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/us 
/politics/shift-on-executive-powers-let-obama-bypass-congress.html. 
 9. Dan Pfeiffer, We Can’t Wait, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Oct. 24, 2011), https://obama 
whitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/10/24/we-cant-wait. 
 10. See, e.g., Paige W. Cunningham, Tom Price: Legislation Only Part of Repealing 
Obamacare, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/tom-
price-legislation-only-part-of-replacing-obamacare/article/2617524; Yousef Saba, Trump 
Announces Executive Actions for Day One, POLITICO (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www. 
politico.com/story/2016/11/donald-trump-executive-actions-231726. 
 11. See Anthony Clark Arend & Catherine B. Lotrionte, Congress Goes to Court: The 
Past, Present, and Future of Legislator Standing, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 281 
(2001) (predicting continued suits from legislators). 
 12. A party has standing when they suffer a concrete, particularized injury that is 
traceable to the defendant’s actions and redressable by the court. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 13. 307 U.S. 433, 456 (1939). 
 14. 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969). 
 15. 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997). 
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standing to the Arizona state legislature,16 and it has permitted congressional 
chambers to defend federal laws as intervenors or amici.17 In United States 
v. Windsor, Justices Alito and Scalia debated each other on whether the 
House had standing in their respective dissents.18 The slate of congressional 
standing doctrine is neither full nor blank. Throughout its decisions, the 
Court has yet to articulate a complete and coherent theory of congressional 
standing. Instead, as often occurs, the Court has provided only narrow 
decisions, each relevant to a theory of congressional standing, but none 
sufficient on its own to provide such a theory.19 
This Article contributes to the discussion of congressional standing by 
arguing that standing differs for various congressional parties. 
Congressional standing is appropriate when the congressional party’s power 
or right matches the alleged injury. For instance, the House did not have 
standing to sue in House v. Burwell,20 but Congress would have. Defenders 
and critics of congressional standing alike have failed to meaningfully 
distinguish between Congress as an institutional plaintiff and a chamber of 
Congress as a plaintiff.21 This includes the district court in House v. 
Burwell,22 academic commentators,23 and Supreme Court justices.24 Unlike 
other defenses of congressional standing, this Article sharply distinguishes 
between standing for Congress, chambers of Congress, and members of 
Congress. Each type of congressional party only has standing when powers 
specifically held by that congressional party are infringed. Congressional 
standing is proper if, and only if, the alleged infringement matches the 
plaintiff’s right. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a background on 
congressional standing, both in Supreme Court precedent and in scholarly 
literature;25 Part III argues in favor of standing for congressional parties 
 
 16. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2677 
(2015). 
 17. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 927 (1983); United States v. Windsor, 570 
U.S. 744, 755 (2013). 
 18. 570 U.S. at 778–818. 
 19. See cases cited supra notes 1318. 
 20. United States House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 75–76 
(D.D.C. 2015). 
 21. See infra notes 2224. 
 22. Id. at 71 (arguing that “the House has suffered a concrete, particularized injury that 
gives it standing to sue” because “Congress (of which the House and Senate are equal) is the 
only body” that has spending power). 
 23. See infra Part I.B. 
 24. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 804–05 (Alito, J. dissenting) (asserting that the “House of 
Representatives . . . suffered . . . an injury” when “Congress’ legislative power” was 
impaired). 
 25. See infra Part II. 
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when the alleged injury matches the party’s constitutional powers;26 Part IV 
discusses separation-of-powers concerns inherent in permitting standing for 
congressional parties;27 Part V explores whether standing for congressional 
parties should extend to claims of executive non-enforcement rather than 
only direct executive infringements on congressional power;28 and then, the 
article briefly concludes.29 
II. BACKGROUND 
Standing doctrine has historically had precious little to say about 
congressional parties. The Supreme Court has never directly confronted the 
question of whether Congress or a chamber of Congress has standing to 
challenge executive action. But in the past few years, a handful of academic 
commentators have begun to take congressional standing doctrine more 
seriously.30 The overall thrust of both precedent and scholarship is that 
Congress and its chambers do not have standing to sue the executive and 
that members of Congress have standing only to guard against vote 
nullification or its equivalent.31 
A. Supreme Court Precedent 
Congressional standing doctrine traces to Coleman v. Miller.32 In 
Coleman, the Court granted standing to a group of state legislators in Kansas 
challenging their executive branch.33 The state senate had deadlocked on a 
vote for a constitutional amendment, and the lieutenant governor of Kansas 
provided the decisive vote to approve of adopting the amendment.34 The 
dissenting state legislators sued, contesting the right of the lieutenant 
governor to vote on constitutional amendments.35 The dissenting legislators 
reasoned that their votes had been essentially nullified by the lieutenant 
governor casting a decisive vote.36 The Court found that the plaintiffs had 
“an interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes” sufficient to 
grant standing.37 The Court emphasized that their votes “would have been 
 
 26. See infra Part III. 
 27. See infra Part IV. 
 28. See infra Part V. 
 29. See infra Part IV. 
 30. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 31. See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.B. 
 32. 307 U.S. 433, 437 (1939). 
 33. Id. at 446. 
 34. Id. at 436. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 436–38. 
 37. Id. at 438. 
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decisive in defeating the ratifying resolution” if the lieutenant governor did 
not cast a vote.38 The Court then ruled against them on the merits, holding 
that it was for Congress to decide whether Kansas ratified the constitutional 
amendment.39 
In Bond v. Floyd and Powell v. McCormack, the Court permitted a state 
legislator and a member of Congress, respectively, to challenge their 
chamber’s attempt to refuse to seat them after being duly elected.40 In Bond, 
the Georgia House of Representatives refused to seat an elected 
representative because of his anti-war viewpoints.41 The Court did not 
specifically address standing, but it nonetheless heard the representative’s 
case and ruled in his favor.42 In Powell, a member of Congress was excluded 
by the House because of personal scandals.43 Again, the Court did not 
directly address standing, but it explicitly found an Article III case or 
controversy.44 In both cases, the legislator had standing to challenge his 
exclusion from his respective institution.45 
The Court had another occasion to address congressional standing in 
Raines v. Byrd.46 Six members of Congress who voted against the Line Item 
Veto Act subsequently sued and challenged its constitutionality, alleging 
that the statute undermined the effect of the members’ votes.47 The statute 
permitted the President to cancel certain tax or funding provisions in 
legislation.48 The Court held that the individual members of Congress did 
not have standing because they did not suffer a “concrete injury.”49 The 
Court described their injury as an “abstract dilution of institutional 
legislative power” insufficient to confer standing.50 That is, the members’ 
votes were given full effect, so they had not suffered an injury.51 The Court 
explained that the institutional injury “necessarily damages all members of 
Congress and both Houses of Congress equally.”52 The only injury was to 
Congress’s institutional legislative powers, not to the members’ voting 
 
 38. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 441. 
 39. Id. at 446–50, 456. 
 40. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 188 (1966); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 489 
(1969). 
 41. Bond, 385 U.S. at 118–28. 
 42. Id. at 136–37. 
 43. Powell, 395 U.S. at 489–90. 
 44. Id. at 495–96. 
 45. Powell, 395 U.S. 486; Bond, 385 U.S. 116. 
 46. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 813–14 (1997). 
 47. Id. at 814. 
 48. Id. at 814–15. 
 49. Id. at 830. 
 50. Id. at 826. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Raines, 521 U.S. at 821. 
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powers.53 The Court specifically noted that neither chamber had approved of 
the members’ suit.54 
The Court has also addressed whether congressional chambers can 
defend a statute in the executive’s stead. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service v. Chadha concerned an immigration statute that permitted a 
chamber of Congress to veto the Service’s decision to suspend deportation 
proceedings.55 The House vetoed the Service’s suspension of deportation 
proceedings against Chadha.56 Chadha sued, arguing that the statute was 
unconstitutional, and the I.N.S. agreed.57 Before the Supreme Court, both the 
House and the Senate separately intervened to defend the constitutionality of 
the statute.58 The Court held that the case presented an Article III case or 
controversy and that Congress was a “proper party” to defend the statute.59 
The Court then ruled against the congressional parties on the merits.60 
A similar issue came before the Court in Windsor.61 The Obama 
administration declined to defend the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 
court.62 However, the administration continued to enforce DOMA, thus 
granting private plaintiffs standing to challenge it.63 The House, through its 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG), intervened to defend the law in 
district court.64 The House lost in district court, and both BLAG and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) appealed.65 The Solicitor General also filed a 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.66 The Second Circuit affirmed the district 
court, and the Supreme Court granted review on both the constitutionality of 
DOMA and on two questions related to whether BLAG could defend the 
law.67 The case then presented the Court with the question of whether 
BLAG—and by extension, the House—had standing to defend a federal law 
in the executive’s stead.68 However, the Court did not decide the issue, 
instead holding that the federal government had standing, and because the 
DOJ appealed and filed the cert. petition, it was unnecessary for the Court to 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 829. 
 55. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 924–26 (1997). 
 56. Id. at 926–28. 
 57. Id. at 928. 
 58. Id. at 928, 930 n.5. 
 59. Id. at 930–31. 
 60. Id. at 959. 
 61. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 744 (2013). 
 62. Id. at 753–54. 
 63. Id. at 754–56. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 754–56. 
 68. Id. 
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determine whether the House also had standing.69 In their respective 
dissents, Justices Scalia and Alito debated whether the House would have 
standing, with Scalia answering “no” and Alito responding “yes.”70 
Most recently, the Court addressed whether a state legislature can have 
standing in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission.71 A constitutional amendment passed by ballot initiative took 
redistricting power away from the Arizona legislature and gave it to the 
Independent Redistricting Commission.72 The Elections Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution arguably gave redistricting power to the Arizona legislature, so 
the legislature sued.73 The Court held that the Arizona legislature plausibly 
suffered an institutional injury—loss of its redistricting power.74 The Court 
reasoned that this case was in line with Coleman because the Arizona 
legislature’s vote over redistricting would now be completely nullified by 
the redistricting commission.75 The Court therefore found that the legislature 
had standing, although it then ruled against the legislature on the merits.76 
B. Scholarship on Congressional Standing 
Little ink has been spilled by academic commentators on the question 
of congressional standing, although in recent years, a handful of scholars 
have begun to discuss the issue.77 The most recent round of scholarship 
primarily focuses on re-litigating House v. Burwell, with some 
commentators defending the Court’s decision78 and others arguing that it did 
not go far enough in granting congressional standing.79 Only a few scholars 
 
 69. Id. The Court also held that BLAG’s participation satisfied prudential adversity 
concerns, but the Court sharply distinguished between those concerns and Article III 
standing. 
 70. Id. at 778–91, 803–04. 
 71. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 
(2015). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 2659. 
 74. Id. at 2663–65. 
 75. Id. at 2665. 
 76. Id. at 2671. 
 77. See infra notes 7881. 
 78. See Bradford C. Mank, Does A House of Congress Have Standing over 
Appropriations?: The House of Representatives Challenges the Affordable Care Act, 19 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 141, 188 (2016) (defending the district court’s decision in House v. Burwell 
on both theories of standing). 
 79. See Bethany R. Pickett, Will the Real Lawmakers Please Stand Up: Congressional 
Standing in Instances of Presidential Nonenforcement, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 439, 459–60 
(2016) (arguing that the House should have had standing to challenge the executive’s failure 
to enforce the employer mandate). 
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have acknowledged the potential difference in standing for Congress and a 
chamber of Congress, and such acknowledgments have been in passing.80 
Defenses of congressional standing have failed to delineate between 
whether a chamber of Congress or only Congress itself could have standing. 
In 1983, an early scholarly defender of congressional standing declared that 
“either house of Congress would unquestionably have standing” to defend 
statutes in court.81 The note argued that Congress suffers an injury when the 
executive refuses to defend a duly-passed statute, but it failed to question 
whether that injury confers standing to chambers of Congress or only 
Congress itself.82 This oversight is not limited to defenders of congressional 
standing: commentators skeptical of congressional standing have similarly 
avoided this issue.83 More recent commentators offer more of the same. 
Bethany Pickett, writing in 2016, defended congressional standing in cases 
of executive non-enforcement, such as in House v. Burwell.84 However, her 
argument does not distinguish between when Congress would have standing 
and when a chamber would have standing.85 Other defenders of 
congressional standing after House v. Burwell take the same approach.86 
A few commentators have acknowledged the potential difference 
between standing by Congress and standing by a chamber, but only in 
passing. Tara Grove and Neal Devins, in their critique of congressional 
standing, argue that the bicameralism requirement precludes unicameral 
standing.87 They vividly argue that “neither house of Congress has standing 
to defend their joint work product in court.”88 However, Grove and Devins 
do not then conclude that Congress can defend its work product.89 What is 
more, Grove and Devins do not situate their critique of unicameral standing 
in standing jurisprudence—they focus on “normative political and historical 
 
 80. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Does United States v. Windsor (the Doma Case) Open 
the Door to Congressional Standing Rights?, 76 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 55 (2014) (asserting 
without discussion that bicameralism does not bar one chamber of Congress from having 
standing); Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself 
in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 575–76 (2014) (arguing that Congress never has standing, 
and briefly mentioning that bicameralism precludes either chamber from defending their 
“joint work product”). 
 81. Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE L.J. 970, 
986–87 (1983) (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 11, at 221. 
 84. Pickett, supra note 79, at 458–61. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. 339, 378–79 (2015); Nat Stern, The Indefinite Deflection of Congressional Standing, 43 
PEPP. L. REV. 1, 22 (2015). 
 87. See Grove & Devins, supra note 80, at 627. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Instead, they dismiss the possibility as unlikely. Id. at 614. 
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analysis,” not particularized injuries.90 Also, they do not consider whether 
bicameralism blocks unicameral standing when the work product is not 
“joint,” but rather specific to that chamber, such as in the advice and consent 
context with the Senate.91 Other commentators have followed suit, briefly 
mentioning that bicameralism may affect unicameral standing without 
delving into the implications,
 92 or noting without elaboration that both 
chambers may suffer an injury when Congress is injured.93 
III. WHEN CONGRESS CAN SUE THE PRESIDENT 
A congressional party should have standing when the alleged 
infringement plausibly intrudes on a right held by the plaintiff. The 
emphasis here is whether the right really belongs to the plaintiff, or whether 
it properly belongs to a different congressional party. This article discusses 
three types of congressional parties: Congress itself, chambers of Congress, 
and members of Congress. This article describes when each type of 
congressional party does and does not have standing. Then, this article 
argues that resolving the question of congressional standing on a party-by-
party basis strikes an appropriate separation-of-powers balance.  
A. Congress as a Plaintiff 
Congress should have standing to sue the executive when powers 
assigned to it by the Constitution are allegedly infringed. For instance, under 
the facts of House v. Burwell,94 Congress would have standing to challenge 
the Obama administration’s alleged appropriation of funds. The Constitution 
gives Congress sole authority to appropriate federal funds.95 The Obama 
administration allegedly usurped that power by appropriating funds for the 
Affordable Care Act without congressional approval.96 If the executive 
branch exercises a right constitutionally assigned to Congress, then 
 
 90. Jack M. Beermann, Congress’s (Less) Limited Power to Represent Itself in Court: A 
Comment on Grove and Devins, 100 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 166, 167 (2014). 
 91. Id. at 173 (“Grove and Devins never analyze whether the Constitution’s 
bicameralism requirement applies to congressional litigation.”). 
 92. See Mank, supra note 78, at 186–87. See also Douglas R. Prince, Should Congress 
Defend Its Own Interests Before the Courts?, 33 STAN. L. REV. 715, 715 (1981) (arguing 
against standing for members of Congress without distinguishing between standing for 
Congress itself compared to a chamber). 
 93. Abner S. Greene, Interpretive Schizophrenia: How Congressional Standing Can 
Solve the Enforce-but-Not-Defend Problem, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 593–94 (2012). 
 94. House v. Burwell (Burwell 1), 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 59–64 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; House v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 168–69 (D.D.C. 
2016). 
 96. Burwell 1, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 63. 
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Congress has suffered a concrete and particularized injury sufficient to 
establish standing. 
Conventional standing doctrine states that a party has standing when 
they suffer a concrete, particularized injury that is traceable to the 
defendant’s actions and redressable by the court.97 The traceability and 
redressability prongs do not pose a great challenge to congressional 
standing—in many instances, it will be clear that the executive infringed on 
Congress’s power and that the court could enjoin the executive from 
continuing to do so. The question of whether Congress suffers a concrete, 
particularized injury when its powers are infringed by the executive poses a 
bigger obstacle. 
Current standing doctrine justifies granting Congress standing when its 
powers are infringed. First, Chadha supports the notion that congressional 
parties suffer a concrete and particularized injury when their powers are 
infringed.98 The Court permitted both the House and Senate to intervene to 
defend statutorily granted legislative veto powers.99 Although the Court did 
not directly discuss why the House and Senate had standing in Chadha, the 
implication is that the chambers’ statutory right to veto deportation 
suspensions was at risk, and the deprivation of that statutory right would 
constitute a particularized and concrete injury.100 The potential injury in 
Chadha was statutory, but the reasoning applies just as strongly if 
Congress’s constitutional powers were threatened. There is nothing in the 
nature of congressional power that prevents Congress from suffering a 
concrete and particularized injury when it is infringed. 
Congressional standing finds further support in Arizona State 
Legislature.101 There, the Supreme Court held that the Arizona legislature 
had standing to challenge a provision of the Arizona Constitution adopted 
by ballot initiative, claiming that it violated powers assigned by the U.S. 
Constitution to the Arizona legislature.102 The Court reasoned that the 
Arizona legislature plausibly suffered an “institutional injury” by being 
deprived of a constitutionally assigned right.103 Similarly, Congress suffers 
an institutional injury when the executive infringes on its constitutionally 
assigned powers. However, the Court in Arizona State Legislature 
 
 97. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 98. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939–40 (1983). 
 99. Id. 
 100. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 783 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Because Chadha concerned the validity of a mode of congressional action—the one-house 
legislative veto—the House and Senate were threatened with destruction of what they 
claimed to be one of their institutional powers.”). 
 101. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2652 
(2015). 
 102. Id. at 2659. 
 103. Id. at 2664. 
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specifically limited its holding to the state context: “[t]he case before us 
does not touch or concern the question whether Congress has standing to 
bring a suit against the President.”104 The Court provided two reasons, 
discussed below, that this case does not decide the question of congressional 
standing.105 Neither undermines the support that Arizona State Legislature 
provides for this Article’s defense of congressional standing. 
First, the Court noted that “[t]here is no federal analogue to Arizona’s 
initiative power.”106 True, but so what? Even if there were a federal 
referendum process, a law passed through that process could violate 
Congress’s constitutionally assigned powers just the same as an executive 
action. The initiative was just the mechanism by which the Arizona 
legislature’s constitutionally assigned power was allegedly infringed. The 
reasoning of Arizona State Legislature does not turn on whether the alleged 
infringement of the legislature’s powers came via the ballot initiative or 
executive action—the Court instead focused on the fact that the legislature’s 
power would be “nullified.”107 If anything, an executive action infringing on 
Congress’s constitutional sphere represents a stronger case for congressional 
standing than a violation via referendum. It is more constitutionally 
repugnant for an overreaching executive to usurp congressional power than 
for the people do to so via a referendum. If the Arizona legislature’s 
constitutional power was violated by the governor controlling redistricting, 
it should have standing to challenge that action just the same. Similarly, 
whether Congress has standing to challenge alleged violations of its power 
by the executive should not turn on the lack of a federal initiative. 
The Court’s second justification for limiting the holding to the state 
context was that “a suit between Congress and the President would raise 
separation-of-powers concerns absent here.”108 The Court here lays its finger 
on the major concern with granting standing to congressional parties. 
Tradition and prudence counsel against the judiciary engaging in turf 
disputes between the political branches.109 If Arizona State Legislature does 
not decide the issue of congressional standing, separation-of-powers 
concerns would be why. Separation of powers as an element of 
congressional standing will be discussed more fully in Part IV.110 
 
 104. Id. at 2665 n. 12. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2665. 
 108. Id. at 2655 n. 12. 
 109. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 779–81 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 110. See infra Part III. 
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From Arizona Legislature, we know that legislatures can suffer 
institutional injuries when their constitutional powers are infringed.111 And 
from Chadha, we know that congressional chambers can have standing 
when statutorily granted rights are infringed.112 Together, then, these cases 
demonstrate that Congress suffers a concrete, particularized injury when its 
powers are usurped by the executive branch, and in such a situation, it has 
standing to defend itself.113 
B. Chambers as Plaintiffs 
Similarly, a chamber of Congress has standing when powers assigned 
to that chamber are allegedly infringed—but not when powers assigned to 
Congress as a whole are infringed.114 For instance, the Constitution gives the 
Senate “advice and consent” power over making treaties and appointing 
certain federal officers.115 If the President were to appoint a cabinet secretary 
without advice and consent of the Senate, the Senate would have standing to 
challenge that action.116 The Senate suffers a particularized and concrete 
injury to its powers when the President appoints a top officer without its 
advice and consent. If the House agreed with the President’s decision, then 
the Senate might not have a realistic political solution. Judicial involvement 
might be the Senate’s best hope for redress. In such a situation, it is 
altogether proper that the Senate have standing to challenge the President’s 
action. 
This is not the situation in House v. Burwell. The right allegedly 
violated, appropriation powers, belongs to Congress, not the House.117 Thus, 
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Congress is the appropriate plaintiff. The court in House v. Burwell stated 
that “[t]he Congress (of which the House and Senate are equal) is the only 
body empowered by the Constitution to adopt laws directing monies to be 
spent from the U.S. Treasury.”118 Yet, the court nonetheless concluded that 
“the House has suffered a concrete, particularized injury that gives it 
standing.”119 The court never explains this discrepancy, but it seems to 
reason that the House’s constitutional role would be undermined if its parent 
body, Congress, suffered an injury.120 The court states that the “role of the 
House would be meaningless” if Congress lost its exclusive appropriation 
power.121 That is, the court seems to acknowledge that Congress is the truly 
injured party, and that the House is only injured by extension.122 
Raines complicates this injury-by-extension defense of standing for the 
House. The Supreme Court held in Raines that six members of Congress did 
not have standing to claim that a statute violated Congress’s constitutional 
powers.123 The Court described the alleged injury as an “abstract dilution of 
institutional legislative power.”124 Congress suffered the injury, not the 
members, and the Court refused to grant the members standing merely 
because Congress suffered an injury.125 To be sure, the Court concluded by 
“attach[ing] some importance to the fact that appellees have not been 
authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress in this 
action.”126 In House v. Burwell, the House itself is the plaintiff,127 but the 
reasoning in Raines nonetheless cuts against the House having standing to 
challenge a violation of the appropriation power.128 
Just as individual members of Congress do not have standing to 
challenge executive actions allegedly violating the powers of Congress as an 
institution, individual chambers of Congress also lack standing in such 
cases. In both Raines and House v. Burwell, the alleged injury occurred at a 
higher institutional level than that of the respective plaintiffs.129 That is, in 
both cases the parent institution of the respective plaintiffs suffered the real 
injury, and the dilution analysis in Raines points against inferring an injury 
by a constituent party.130 Raines explained that the alleged injury was to “all 
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[m]embers of Congress and both Houses of Congress equally.”131 The injury 
was diluted among the constituent parts of Congress and, therefore, only 
fully particularized for Congress itself.132 For individual members, the injury 
is two institutional levels up—the individual member would only be injured 
insofar as his or her chamber is injured, and that chamber is only injured 
insofar as Congress itself is injured. For an individual chamber, the injury is 
only one institutional level off, but the injury still does not match the 
plaintiff. 
That difference in the degree of dilution perhaps explains why the court 
in House v. Burwell failed to delineate between an injury to Congress and an 
injury to the House.133 The court in House v. Burwell attempted to 
distinguish Raines, arguing that in Burwell there is no “dilution” of 
legislative power, whereas in Raines the power was diluted among the 
members of Congress.134 The court is certainly right that the legislative 
power is not diluted 535 ways in House v. Burwell. Instead, the dilution is 
two ways—between the House and the Senate. However, dilution remains; 
it is just a matter of degree. The House itself does not suffer an undiluted, 
particularized injury when the executive allegedly violates Congress’s 
appropriations power—only Congress does. Therefore, only Congress 
would have standing. 
Justice Alito, dissenting in Windsor, argued that the House has standing 
to defend a federal statute, although he does not explicitly distinguish 
between when Congress would have standing compared to the House.135 
Alito argued that the House was a “necessary party” to the passage of the 
statute.136 Here, Alito read Coleman as saying that the state legislators had 
standing because their votes “would have carried the day” absent outside 
intervention.137 He then used this argument to distinguish Raines, concluding 
that the members of Congress in Raines did not have standing because those 
members were not “the pivotal figures” in the legislation at issue.138 
Therefore, Alito’s argument for single-chamber standing turned on the fact 
that the single chamber is a necessary actor in a statute’s passage. Because 
that chamber is necessary for the statute’s passage, the chamber should have 
standing to defend it—and, possibly, challenge the executive for failing to 
properly implement it. 
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Justice Alito’s reading of Coleman and Raines is more plausible than 
the district court’s in House v. Burwell, but it also has its problems.139 To 
start, Alito never explicitly connected the “necessary” criterion to standing 
jurisprudence.140 Normally, standing jurisprudence asks whether the party 
has suffered a particularized, concrete injury.141 As Alito acknowledged, 
Congress suffers such an injury when its legislative powers are infringed,142 
but Alito never explained why the House also suffers a particularized injury 
just because its action is necessary for Congress to legislate.143 Certainly, the 
House would suffer an injury if Congress acted without its consent. That 
would be the equivalent of vote nullification, but that is quite different from 
Alito’s conclusion that the House suffers an injury when Congress’s powers 
are infringed simply because the House’s consent is a necessary part of 
congressional action. 
Alito might connect his argument to the injury element of standing 
jurisprudence by arguing that the injury to Congress is passed on to its 
chambers. This is the same type of “abstract dilution of institutional 
legislative power” that the Court found in Raines which does not grant 
standing.144 Even if this constitutes a real injury suffered by the chamber, it 
is not a “particularized” injury as required by standing jurisprudence. The 
“particularized” element of the injury requirement means that the plaintiff is 
injured in a “personal and individual way.”145 The House is not injured in an 
“individual way” when Congress’s powers are infringed. Instead, it is only 
affected by virtue of being a constituent chamber of Congress. The injury is 
secondary; it is derivative, not concrete and particularized. If the chambers 
only suffer an injury by extension, then Congress, rather than the chambers, 
should be the appropriate plaintiff. 
Alito’s argument also leads to absurdities. Imagine that the House sues 
the executive for appropriating funds without authorization. Alito’s theory 
would grant the House standing, because the House is necessary for the 
passage of an appropriations bill. Now imagine that the Senate disagrees 
with the House and files an amicus brief—or even intervenes—in favor of 
the executive. The House and Senate, then, would be on opposite sides of a 
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suit about the powers of Congress, even though such power could only be 
exercised by both chambers acting together.146 
Another absurdity: If a bill passes the House by one vote, then every 
member who voted yes was a necessary party to its passage. By Alito’s 
reasoning, that might mean every member now has standing to challenge the 
executive if the law goes unenforced. However, if the bill passed by five 
votes, then, echoing Raines, a single member would not have standing.147 A 
coalition of five members, though, would be a necessary party, and as a 
group, they would have standing. If being a “necessary party” to the 
exercise of congressional power is sufficient to generate standing, then such 
silly vote-counting exercises seem inevitable. 
Alito also pointed to Chadha for support.148 He argued that Chadha 
“suggested” that Congress suffered an institutional injury sufficient to grant 
standing.149 That may be true, but Chadha does not imply that a chamber has 
standing to protect powers assigned to Congress.150 Instead, in Chadha, the 
powers in question were unicameral—each chamber could exercise a 
legislative veto independently—and both chambers intervened to defend 
their unicameral powers.151 Alito responded that this is a “distinction without 
a difference.”152 This Article’s defense of congressional standing supplies 
the difference: a congressional party only has standing when powers 
assigned to that party are infringed. In Chadha, each chamber had a 
statutory power that was threatened with “destruction.”153 The chambers 
both intervened in their individual capacity, just as would be appropriate 
under this Article’s theory of party-specific congressional standing.154 
Fundamentally, Alito’s argument is inconsistent with this Article’s 
conception of the constitutional role of the chambers vis-a-vis Congress. 
Article I provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers . . . shall be vested in a 
Congress . . . which shall consist of a Senate and House of 
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Representatives.”155 Also, bicameralism precludes the House from 
exercising independent legislative authority.156 Only Congress has 
legislative power,157 and the powers of Congress differ fundamentally from 
those of its constituent chambers or members.158 Congress is more than the 
sum of its parts. Only Congress, therefore, suffers an injury when legislative 
powers assigned to it are infringed. Chambers, on the other hand, have 
standing not to defend Congress’s constitutional powers, but rather only to 
defend powers specific to the chamber. 
C. Members as Plaintiffs 
Compared to what the Supreme Court has said about standing for 
Congress or its chambers, case law on standing for individual legislators is 
rich. This Article’s defense of congressional standing comports with the 
Court’s case law for standing for members of Congress. Members can have 
standing, but only in narrow circumstances where their constitutionally 
assigned powers are violated. The Constitution grants members the right to 
be seated in and vote on matters before their respective chamber.159 Also, 
members have a few discrete rights, such as guaranteed compensation.160 
Only when one of these narrow rights are violated would a member have 
standing to sue the executive. 
The trio of Coleman v. Miller, Powell v. McCormack, and Raines v. 
Byrd provides the contours of standing for members of Congress.161 
Coleman found that state legislators have an “interest in maintaining the 
effectiveness of their votes” sufficient to provide standing.162 That is, the 
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legislators in Coleman did not allege that the power of their vote was 
undermined because the state senate’s power was infringed, but rather that 
their individual votes were not given effect within the state senate because 
of a decisive outside influence—the lieutenant governor.163 Similarly, in 
Powell v. McCormack, the Court found an Article III case or controversy 
when a member of Congress challenged the House’s attempt to exclude him 
from taking his seat without formal expulsion.164 The right to take his seat 
was personal to the member. To be sure, Powell involved a member 
challenging action by his chamber rather than the executive.165 But if 
anything, the member’s case for standing would be stronger if the President 
rather than the House refused to let him take his seat in Congress.166 
Irrespective, the member in Powell had a personal prerogative that he could 
defend in federal court.167 
Raines distinguishes both Coleman and Powell in holding that six 
members of Congress could not challenge the constitutionality of the Line 
Item Veto Act as diluting their voting power by diminishing Congress’s role 
in appropriations.168 Raines held that the alleged injury was “institutional,” 
not “personal” to the members of Congress.169 The Court explained that this 
was unlike Coleman, because in Raines the members’ votes “were given full 
effect” and continue to be given full effect.170 In Coleman, there was “vote 
nullification,” whereas in Raines there was only “abstract dilution of 
institutional legislative power.”171 Raines distinguished Powell on the same 
grounds: unlike in Powell where the member was “singled out,” the claim in 
Raines is only an “institutional injury.”172 
The unifying thread of these three cases is that members of Congress 
have standing when their right to vote on matters before Congress is 
allegedly infringed.173 That right might be infringed by the member’s 
chamber refusing to seat them, as in Powell,174 or it might be infringed by 
vote nullification via an outcome-determinative executive action, as in 
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Coleman.175 However, members do not have standing to challenge a mere 
dilution of the potential influence of their vote when Congress’s powers are 
restricted, as in Raines.176 The latter scenario implicates Congress’s rights, 
not the rights of the members of Congress. 
One can imagine a constitutional provision that would more clearly 
generate cases where members would have standing.177 Imagine a 
constitutional amendment that gave individual Senators veto power over 
federal judicial appointments in their home state.178 If either home state 
Senator vetoed a judicial nomination, the nomination would fail. Imagine 
further that the President, appalled by a Senator’s intransigence, ignored that 
Senator’s veto. The President’s nominee was confirmed by the Senate at 
large, and the judge took their seat. In this scenario, the Senator who 
exercised the veto power should have standing because of an institutional 
injury to that Senator’s constitutional office. The Constitution assigned a 
specific power to the Senator, and the executive allegedly violated that 
power. The Senator would therefore have standing. 
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Any defense of congressional standing must confront significant 
separation-of-powers concerns. Such concerns are the cornerstone of 
standing jurisprudence.179 Separation-of-powers principles are particularly 
salient when standing implicates a conflict between the branches.180 But just 
as a defense of some form of congressional standing must grapple with 
separation-of-powers principles, so does a blanket denial of congressional 
standing. Judicial involvement in an interbranch dispute risks disrupting an 
appropriate separation-of-powers balance, as does judicial abdication. A 
defense of congressional standing that distinguishes between different 
congressional parties strikes the appropriate balance between permitting 
limited judicial involvement in interbranch disputes without unduly 
embroiling the judiciary in matters best left to the political process. 
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Prudence and tradition counsel against any far-reaching theory of 
congressional standing. Consistent judicial involvement in interbranch 
political disputes would “risk damaging public confidence that is vital to the 
functioning of the Judicial Branch.”181 The specter of a Supreme Court 
standing “at the apex of government, empowered to decide all constitutional 
questions” should caution against persistent judicial involvement in 
interbranch political disputes.182 One can all too easily imagine that if the 
decision in House v. Burwell were affirmed, suits against the executive by 
chambers of Congress would become commonplace. In response to Justice 
Alito’s defense of single-chamber standing in Windsor, Justice Scalia 
argued that “the opportunities for dragging the courts” into political disputes 
would be “endless.”183 The judiciary’s claim to be a non-political branch 
would become even more tenuous than it already is. Instead, the judiciary 
might find itself involved in numerous turf disputes between the political 
branches. 
A blanket denial of congressional standing raises grave separation-of-
powers concerns as well. The constitutional system of separation of powers 
would be undermined if the President could usurp congressional power 
while the judiciary watched from the sidelines. Indeed, that concern 
prompted the Court in Windsor to permit the House to defend a federal 
statute in the executive’s stead.184 This concern is further illustrated in 
House v. Burwell, where “despite an intentional refusal by Congress to 
appropriate funds for Section 1402, the Secretaries freely ignored Article I, 
§ 9, cl. 7 of the Constitution and sought other sources of public money.”185 
While the Court has not often granted standing to congressional parties, it 
has struck down laws that accord too much or too little authority to one 
branch of government,186 and it should do so even when the dispute is 
directly between the political branches. If the executive ignores both the 
Constitution and the will of Congress, the judiciary does not serve the 
separation of powers by inaction. Instead, such inaction harms the 
constitutional system of separation of powers. 
It is possible to strike a balance between these two worries. Limiting 
congressional standing based on the congressional party imposes sharp 
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limits on suits from congressional parties, avoiding the worry of a judiciary 
constantly embroiled in political turf disputes. The House would not be able 
to sue the Obama administration under a non-appropriation theory, contra 
House v. Burwell. Also, individual members could not sue the executive 
when they believe Congress’s powers have been infringed either, in line 
with the Court’s decision in Raines.187 However, congressional party suits 
would be permitted in narrow circumstances when the alleged injury 
matches the plaintiff’s right. Judicial involvement in interbranch disputes 
remains proper when the judiciary serves as a “last resort.”188 This provides 
an opening for the judiciary to defend the constitutional system of separation 
of powers when, and only when, judicial involvement is necessary and 
appropriate. 
Two countervailing forces sharply limit the number of cases where 
congressional parties would file suit and have standing to do so. On the one 
hand, the Constitution assigns many more powers to Congress than to its 
chambers, and more to chambers than to individual members.189 The higher 
up you go, the more powers the congressional party has. Therefore, there are 
more chances for the executive to violate that party’s powers. On the other 
hand, the barriers to suits by Congress are more significant than barriers to a 
suit by a chamber, which in turn are more significant than barriers to a suit 
by members. Congress can only sue when both chambers approve, which 
will be rare in an era of divided, partisan government. Additionally, 
Congress always has the option to resolve political disputes through the 
normal policy-making process rather than through time-consuming, risky 
litigation.190 In most cases, a private plaintiff will have a much easier time 
getting into court than Congress, so Congress will not even bother trying. 
Chambers only need a majority of their own members to approve a suit, 
which still poses a significant barrier. Meanwhile, members can file suits 
independently with few barriers. Overall, the more power the relevant 
congressional party has, the more challenging procedural obstacles to 
defending that power in a lawsuit. These forces work against each other to 
ensure that proper suits by congressional parties would be rare. 
V. ENFORCEMENT CLAIMS 
Even if we frame the discussion of congressional standing as party 
specific, it still leaves open the question of what rights Congress would have 
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standing to defend. In House v. Burwell, the House sued the executive on 
two separate theories: (1) the non-appropriation theory, that the executive 
appropriated funds that it was not authorized to appropriate, violating 
Congress’s appropriation powers;191 and (2) the employer-mandate theory, 
that the executive failed to implement the employer mandate, violating 
Congress’s general legislative powers.192 Congress should have standing to 
challenge executive appropriations made contrary to law, as in House v. 
Burwell.193 That is a clear usurpation of a power solely assigned to Congress 
by the Constitution.194 However, it is not as clear if Congress suffers an 
injury when the executive fails to faithfully implement a statute.195 The court 
in House v. Burwell concluded that it did not.196 Additionally, Justice Scalia 
also argued against standing for enforcement claims in his dissent in 
Windsor.197 He critiqued Justice Alito’s defense of congressional standing 
for allowing Congress to go to court “not only to vindicate its own 
institutional powers to act, but to correct a perceived inadequacy in the 
execution of its laws.”198 These types of enforcement-based standing claims 
have received comparably significant discussion in academic literature.199 
Congress should have standing claims against obvious executive non-
enforcement. There are two constitutional hooks for Congress’s injury. First, 
the Constitution vests “[a]ll legislative powers herein granted” to 
Congress.200 The executive usurps that power by refusing to implement a 
duly-passed congressional statute. Second, the President has an affirmative 
duty to “take Care that the laws be faithfully executed.”201 The President 
may have discretion in deciding how to execute a law, but he or she does not 
have discretion over whether a law should be executed at all.202 Read 
together, these provisions indicate that Congress has the power to pass 
legislation with the expectation that its legislation will be faithfully 
implemented. If the President violates that power, Congress suffers a 
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particularized injury just the same as if the President usurped Congress’s 
appropriations power. 
The court in House v. Burwell disagreed.203 It described Congress’s 
legislative authority as flowing from Article I’s “most general provision.”204 
The court found that the “generalized nature” of the ineffective 
implementation claim precludes it from involving a particularized and 
concrete injury for standing claims.205 Another way to put it: even if 
Congress has legislative powers, those powers do not extend to grant 
Congress a legal interest in effective enforcement.206 Yet, if the President 
refuses to implement a statute or twists a statute beyond the point of 
recognition, that infringes Congress’s legislative powers just as much as 
appropriating funds without congressional approval infringes Congress’s 
appropriation powers. Justice Alito argued that “any impairment” of 
Congress’s legislative power is a “grievous injury” to Congress’s “central 
function.”207 There are also constitutional hooks for Congress’s injury in the 
vesting clause and in the take care clause. Obstinate non-enforcement 
functionally repeals congressional legislation.208 That injures Congress 
sufficiently for Congress to have standing to defend itself. 
Justice Scalia thought congressional standing entirely inappropriate on 
separation of powers grounds.209 He was particularly worried about 
enforcement claims, which would allow Congress to “pop immediately into 
court” whenever the President “implements a law in a manner that is not to 
Congress’s liking.”210 Indeed, Scalia seemed to concede the injury point, and 
instead focused his critique on the prospect of too much political litigation 
from Congress.211 However, a party-specific defense of congressional 
standing keeps the floodgates closed. If only Congress, not its chambers, has 
standing to challenge executive non-enforcement, the practical barriers to 
filing a suit on behalf of Congress, as an institution, will prevent it from 
routinely popping into court. Contrary to Scalia’s concern that Congress will 
resolve implementation and enforcement disputes through litigation rather 
than through policy-making,212 Congress will likely only resort to litigation 
when it perceives the regular policy-making process to have failed to protect 
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its powers. Refusing to confirm executive nominees or blocking the 
President’s agenda seems like a much quicker and expedient resolution to a 
dispute with the executive than filing a suit and waiting for years of 
litigation to come to an end—and agenda-blocking only requires one 
chamber. Plus, in most cases, Congress can rest assured that private 
plaintiffs with clear-cut standing will attack executive actions. Only in rare 
cases will Congress itself be the sole plaintiff. 
This Article’s defense of congressional standing describes which 
congressional party should have standing to challenge executive actions. If 
any congressional party were to have standing to challenge executive non-
enforcement, it would certainly be Congress rather than its chambers or 
members. This Article’s defense of standing for congressional parties is 
nonetheless compatible with either granting or denying congressional 
standing over enforcement claims. However, because Congress suffers a 
similar injury in enforcement cases as it does in appropriation cases and 
litigation would only occur in extraordinary circumstances, Congress should 
have standing for enforcement claims. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Congressional parties have standing to challenge executive action only 
when the alleged infringement matches the plaintiff’s rights. Contrary to the 
district court in House v. Burwell and Justice Alito’s dissent in Windsor, 
individual chambers do not have standing when the powers of Congress are 
infringed. However, they do have standing to defend against violations of 
powers specifically assigned to an individual chamber by the Constitution. 
Further, members of Congress can have standing too, but only when their 
rights—such as the right to vote on matters before their chamber—are 
infringed. Individual members do not have standing to defend the powers of 
Congress as an institution. 
This limited defense of congressional standing satisfies separation-of-
powers concerns brought up by both sides of the debate. Justice Scalia’s 
concern that congressional standing will turn the judiciary into a roving 
monitor, perpetually involved in political turf disputes, does not apply to this 
Article’s limited defense of congressional standing that only permits suits 
when the specific rights of the plaintiff are at issue. Further, the contrary 
concern that judicial involvement is sometimes necessary to protect the 
constitutional order is also resolved by this Article’s limited defense of 
congressional standing. Congressional parties have standing to defend their 
powers, but only their powers. The increasingly cumbersome barriers to 
suits from congressional parties ensure that few disputes will get into court 
and survive standing concerns. However, those that do will involve real, 
concrete controversies, just as Article III requires. 
